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Symposium Conclusion
Pieter J. Hoets*
N PRESENTING THIS SYMPOSIUM, the Editors are well aware that
this discussion by no means exhausts the subject. Neverthe-
less, enough old and new material has been collected to enable
the reader to come to some tentative conclusions.
As group defamation and bigotry are old problems, it already
has been established that, in certain instances, the victim of
such defamation can follow two paths in order to challenge the
legal fortress of his attacker.
In some States, where group defamation law exists, the de-
famer can be indicted for violation of a criminal statute, and,
in addition, the plaintiff can bring a civil tort action for damages.
Yet in both situations the defamer has formidable means at
his disposal to block the path of the plaintiff. The principal de-
fenses are (1) freedom of expression; (2) the size of the group
defamed; and (3) difficulties in establishing specific damage on
the part of the individual plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of the United States over ten years ago
upheld the constitutionality of such a state criminal statute; but
the 5 to 4 decision indicated differences of opinion on the issue
of freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Today, the emergence of extreme right-wing organizations,
born of frustration and fear, manifests reaction to the nervous
wear and tear of the long struggle against world communism.
Professional hate mongers have seized upon these organizations
as vehicles, ready sources of support, and cloaks of "super-
patriotic" respectability. Group defamation by these extremists
is mounting. It long has been one of the weapons of the com-
munists.
Senator Kuchel's speech on "The Fright Peddlers" evoked
various reactions:
"A brazen attempt to smear millions of patriotic American
citizens by innuendo" said fellow California (Republican) Repre-
sentative James B. Utt-the same man who admitted on national
* B.A., Nederlands Lyceum, The Hague; LL.B., Leiden Law School; LL.M.,
Yale Law School; Chairman, French Department of University School,
Cleveland, Ohio; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
TV that he had spread the scare rumor about "Operation Water
Moccasin".
Senator Javits (Republican) of New York, on the other
hand, congratulated his colleague from California on his speech
and added:
The thing to do is to take on the rascals frontally, and
speak out against organizations like the Birch Society-and
not every member of the Birch Society necessarily feels
that way-and speak out . . . also in campaigns . . . When
this sort of thing begins, it does not stop. It goes on and on,
and can be directed against Jews, Catholics, Negroes, Japa-
nese, Mexicans, or any one else.
The Washington Daily News of May 4th, 1963, had the fol-
lowing comments:
Senator Kuchel has been reading his mail. He calls it
"fright mail."
The John Birch Society, and similar outfits were the par-
ticular-and no doubt appropriate-targets of Senator
Kuchel's alarm.
What the Senator did not do, wisely, in exposing and re-
butting these extremists, was to demand action against them,
punitive and restrictive.
The stuff that alarms the senator from California can be
divided in two parts: The first part consists of wildly radical
opinions on foreign, military and national policy. The second
part consists of group defamation.
The first type of such fright mail clearly falls within the
protection of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment,
no matter how idiotic it sounds. Freedom of speech (freedom
from censorship) is one of the pillars on which the republican
structure of government is built. American and other jurists,
and people from all walks of life, have fought and died for this
right, in the face of the brutal absolutism of such despots as
Kings Philip II, James I, and Charles I, the Bourbons of France,
and modern tyrants such as Hitler and Stalin.
We are bound by the Constitution, and by common sense,
to let such nonsense speak for itself. If too many Californians
believe that the United States is being occupied by U. N.
Congolese tribes fresh from Africa with rings in their noses, it
would seem that there is something the matter with the Ameri-
can news media, the United States Information Service, or the
schools of California.
Yet, all of these defects can be remedied without impairing
freedom of expression. It seems that Senator Kuchel's speech,
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as to this type of ignorance, had this object in mind: To bring
the organized nonsense out in the open. The general public
snorts and chuckles will hurt the fright peddlers more than re-
strictive legislation.
But there is a less innocent parcel in Senator Kuchel's mail
box. That is the mounting flow of group-defamation matter. This
is no mere foolishness. It is vicious, and dangerous to the nation.
In our search for answers to this problem we have sought
and obtained opinions from legal experts in France, England, the
Netherlands, and West Germany. In all four countries freedom of
expression is recognized as a basic ingredient of democratic so-
ciety and government. But variations among the legal views
from these countries are manifest.
From France we learn that group defamation there is not
much of a problem. This opinion can be accepted on the follow-
ing grounds: Frenchmen in general are both nationalistic and
individualistic. The latter trait, encouraged by Voltaire and
Rousseau, exploded to the foreground during the French Revolu-
tion, and ever since has been part of the French national image.
Individuality is respected in France and the people are free-
ly allowed to be different as long as they are French. Thus, the
genuine desire of French governments and legislators to in-
tegrate foreign and colored elements in Metropolitan France
with the rest of the population, has met with considerable suc-
cess. Thus, too, there was some legislation in the wake of the
Nazi occupation, to protect the hard hit Jewish groups, but also
there is strict interpretation of these laws by the courts, as if to
remind minority groups that the better way to solve their prob-
lems is to become truly Frenchmen.
From the Netherlands we learn that the problem of group
defamation can be met squarely by courageous legislation, both
criminal and civil. The forthright and logical Dutch legislation
on the subject can well be a model for American emulation,
though we probably should be more cautious about entrusting
censorship powers to elected local officials. The Dutch seem to
have solved the problem, and we should study their methods
most particularly.
From England we find, as expected, that most of the legal
principles which apply to group defamation in the United States
originated in the mother country. There, the Lords have argued
that legislators should stay out of this legal area, as it touches
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on human morality. Furthermore, they say, it seems to be natural
for man to vent his emotions against those who are different
and foreign. At first examination this rule of English common
sense seems reasonable. But many second thoughts crowd in.
We wonder if a rule that served well in a "tight little isle" really
is best for our new society.
Man, since he first crawled out of his caves, has come a
long way. In the long span of history many old "rules" have
been discarded. Thus, gladiatorial spectacles, once generally ap-
proved, have been outlawed. Slaves have been emancipated.
Absolute kings have lost their heads. The Geneva Convention
humanized the treatment of prisoners of war. Many nations
have outlawed capital punishment.
Germany particularly had come a long, hard way. Then it
happened. A disastrous World War I; a defeated and exhausted
German nation; mass unemployment and despair; a search for
a scapegoat. Then, Adolf Hitler and Dr. Joseph Goebbels. The
latter, a journalist by profession, applied his genius to, and de-
veloped, group defamation into a diabolic science and an evil
art such as the world never before had seen.
The descent into barbarism started in Germany with sys-
tematic group defamation. It ended with the murder of six mil-
lion Jews, with half of Germany lost to the communists, and all
of Germany temporarily in ruins. The cost to the world, in blood
and tears, never can be calculated. This so recent set back in
the upward trend of Western civilization can not be ignored.
It is obvious that the Constitution of the United States and
the common sense of the American people must prevent similar
excesses in this country. And we feel a chill of foreboding as
we think of the recent riots in Alabama, culminating in the
bombing of a Negro church, causing the death of several Ameri-
can children.
True, the governor of Alabama has promised a reward for
the apprehension of the culprits. But the real cause of these
outrages was group defamation.
It is almost certain that premeditated, malicious, and re-
peated group defamation incited to violence the men who mur-
dered those children.
Thus we see on the one hand an explosive racial defamation
situation and resulting violence, and on the other hand the 20th
century text books and lessons of Dr. Goebbels.
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Clearly the situation in the United States of 1963 is different
from that of Merrie Old England, where the rule could develop
into law, that courts should not unduly interfere with the tend-
ency of man to vent his emotions against groups that are dif-
ferent. A "healthy British contempt" for all that was foreign
fitted perfectly into the pattern of European historic rivalry, in
the precarious continental balance of power and maintenance of
a dominant British position in European and world affairs. More-
over, no racial problems plagued the British Isles in pre-war
times.
In the United States of 1963, with fifty different states, and
various territories, and with a population composed of many dif-
ferent races, colors, religions, and nationality backgrounds, the
situation calls for a different approach. Too much hate propa-
ganda in the successful melting pot may turn it into a cracked
pressure cooker.
With group defamation and group violence mounting daily,
we will do well to review right now how absolute our rules on
Freedom of Expression ought to be.
We all know, already, that if a man should enter a crowded
theater and shout "Fire!" he soon will find out that he has vio-
lated a criminal statute. Clearly, his freedom of speech is not
absolute.
If freedom of speech is not absolute, should freedom to de-
fame large groups of fellow citizens remain absolute? We think
not.
Under existing law in most American jurisdictions the de-
famer of large groups seems to be in an absolute position of
power, protected in an impregnable legal pocket. From his
sanctuary behind the shibboleth of "free speech," he can hurl,
Without risk, his deeply hurtful slanders and libels against any
large group of other Americans. He almost never realizes or
cares that, in so doing, he causes irreparable damage to his
country and ultimately to himself.
This legal situation plainly is no longer tolerable.
The time for federal and state legislative action has arrived.
This is not so much because we shed tears for the defamed mi-
nority group-we still like to think of an American as a tough in-
dividual who can take care of himself against all comers-but
because such law does not fit the American concept of fair play,
and because it is a clear and present danger to the nation.
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The question then is: What to do about this law?
And mirabile dictu, the answers seem to come from Ger-
many. We are not surprised at finding that Dutch law already
has grappled with the problem, apparently with great success.
Out of the German ruins of World War II emerged not only
an economic miracle of reconstruction, but also a positive at-
titude as to how to cope with poisonous group defamation,
especially after a minor renewal of swastika-manifestations in
1958-1959.
Although the principle of freedom of speech is recognized as
one of the important legal foundations on which the modern
German Federal Republic is built, this right definitely now is not
absolute in cases of group defamation. The German Supreme
Court on at least one occasion has given a broad interpretation
of the law in favor of the plaintiff in a group defamation case.
In addition, German legislators have widened the second
path referred to in the beginning of this paper.
Thus, the defaming of groups in Germany, as well as in the
Netherlands, now can be a very costly pastime for the defendant,
under multi-pronged criminal and tort action rules.
Referring to the classic difficulty of proving specific damage
to the complaining member of a defamed group or class in the
United States, we should note that this problem now seems to be
nearing solution, because of an extrinsic development. In the in-
creasing influence of medico-legal experts on personal injury
cases, and growing realization of the manifestations and symp-
toms of despondency and other psychiatric and mental troubles
of victims of group defamation, in the last decades, a new factor
is visible. Medical experts now have substantial answers to the
question of what specific damage is done to the psyche and the
emotional stability of the individual, even if he is only an un-
identified member of a large defamed group or class. Such medi-
cal expert testimony already is substantial enough to guide the
courts. Indeed, in recent years American courts already have
begun to treat acts causing "merely" emotional and mental suf-
fering as separate, actionable torts in themselves.
Of course, premeditated, malicious and repetitious group
defamation, especially if carried on for profit, ought to be dis-
tinguished from other group defamation. Whereas "ordi-
nary," "casual" group defamation might still be left alone, the
more vicious type should be outlawed. In addition, there should
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be legislation to keep hate propaganda out of the United States
mails, radio, television, and other public communication avenues.
"The thing to do is to take on the rascals frontally," as sug-
gested by Senator Javits. Responsible, aggressive reporting can
take care of the organized nonsense fomenters. But premedi-
tated, malicious and repetitious group defamation requires fed-
eral and state legislative action.
Tort liability, based on modern medical understanding of the
very real injury to an individual member of a defamed group,
probably is the readiest and best preventive of abuse of the right
of free speech until sound legislation is adopted. But we need
both criminal and civil law.
This does not mean that the extremists shall have no right
to be heard. Their bizarre contributions are part of the great
debate which never should be barred. But the poisonous fallout
of group defamation must be eliminated.
The murder of President John F. Kennedy undoubtedly was
a product of the hate campaigns that now are "normal" through-
out the world. Just before that awful event, also in Dallas, Adlai
Stevenson, our ambassador to the United Nations, was struck and
spat upon by other extremists. President Lyndon B. Johnson, not
long before in the same state, had faced insults and threats from
other haters. Poisonous hatreds, carefully planted and cultivated,
are blossoming into flowers of evil. Left wing, right wing, and all
kinds of bigots and hate mongers are diabolically busy, sowing
and nurturing the defamations that are the seeds of destruction.
This Law Review planned this Symposium a year ago. The
death of our noble and beloved President makes frighteningly
urgent the need (for better law to curb hate mongers) that in-
spired this Symposium.
In the last analysis all legislation deals with morality-legis-
lates morality. The law serves not only to regulate but also to
educate, elevate, and dignify. It must deal with group defamation
now. We must have law that will protect us from the sick and
evil souls who poison our society with hatreds.
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